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model of unemployment in macroeconomics. Recent work (Shimer
2005) shows that under common parameter values the standard search
and matching model cannot account for the cyclical volatilities of vacancies
and unemployment observed in the data.1 This difﬁculty is related to the
ﬂexibility or, alternatively, rigidity of real wages over the business cycle.2 In
this article, I review empirical evidence on wage ﬂexibility as it relates to
search and matching models.
The search and matching model introduces frictions into the labor market
in the sense that workers and employers cannot costlessly contact each other.
In an economy with frictions, market prices are not competitively determined,
and the standard search and matching framework assumes that wages are de-
termined by a particular solution to a bargaining problem between workers
and employers, the Nash bargaining solution. Under this bargaining, wages
increase when productivity is high, thus limiting incentives for job creation.
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) show that replacing the Nash bargaining solu-
tionwithanalternativewagedeterminationprocedurethatmakeswagesmore
rigid ampliﬁes the volatility of unemployment and vacancies the model can
generate.
I am grateful to Andreas Hornstein, Arantxa Jarque, Damba Lkhagvasuren, Aysegul Sahin,
Pierre-Daniel Sarte, Roman Sysuyev, and Antonella Trigari for their generous comments and
discussions. All views and errors are mine alone. I thank Nadezhda Malysheva and Devin
Reilly for help in editing the earlier draft. The views expressed here are those of the author
and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal
Reserve System. E-mail: marianna.kudlyak@rich.frb.org.
1 The “standard search and matching model” refers to the model studied by Shimer (2005)
and developed in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Pissarides (2000) provides a textbook exposition
of the standard search and matching model.
2 The terms “rigid” and “acyclical” are used interchangeably and imply a lack of response
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Thislineofresearchmotivatesimportantquestions: Howﬂexible,orrigid,
are real wages over the business cycle? Is observed wage rigidity consistent
withthewagerigidityneededtoamplifytheﬂuctuationsinthetextbooksearch
and matching model?
In the job creation decision, a ﬁrm takes into account not only the initial
wage in a newly formed match but also the entire expected stream of future
wages to be paid in the match. Thus, job creation in frictional labor markets
places the focus on the cyclical behavior of the expected present discounted
value of wages. The volatility of unemployment in the model depends on the
intensity of job creation through changes in the job ﬁnding rate. As Shimer
(2004)emphasizes,whatisrelevantforthevolatilityofjobcreation,and,thus,
ofunemployment, istherigidityofthepresentdiscountedvalueofwagesthat,
at the time of hiring, a ﬁrm expects to pay to a worker over the course of the
employment relationship.
A large empirical literature exists that studies the behavior of individual




One crucial aspect of the existing empirical literature is that it provides
evidence on the cyclical behavior of the current wage, but not on the cyclical
behavior of the expected present discounted value of future wages within a
matchformedinthecurrentperiod. Emphasizingtheimportanceofthefuture
wages to be paid in the long-term employment relationships, Kudlyak (2007)
estimates the cyclicality of the user cost of labor, which is the difference
between the expected present discounted value of wages paid to a worker
hired in the current period and the value paid to a worker hired the following
period. Kudlyak constructs the user cost of labor from the individual wage
and turnover data. She ﬁnds that the user cost of labor is more cyclical than
wages of newly hired workers. Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2009) argue
for the importance of the elasticity of the expected present discounted value
ofwageswithrespecttotheexpectedpresentdiscountedvalueofproductivity
in newly formed matches, which they refer to as permanent values of wages




productivity for the case of instantaneously rebargained wages” and “can be
seen as a lower bound for [the elasticity of the permanent wage with respect
to permanent productivity] in the case of wage rigidity on the job.”
Pissarides (2009), Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2009), and Kudlyak
(2009) study whether the search and matching model can simultaneously
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and Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2009) compare the elasticity of wages
in the model to the elasticity of wages of newly hired workers in the data.
They conclude that making wages in the model rigid enough to generate the
observedvolatilityofunemploymentrequiresmorerigidwagesthanarefound
in the data. Kudlyak (2009) shows that the free entry condition in the model
ties together match productivity and the user cost of labor. She calibrates the
model to match the estimated cyclicality of the user cost of labor and con-
cludes that the model calibrated to wage data cannot generate the empirical
volatilities of the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
In summary, in the model, the rigid expected present discounted value
of wages in newly formed matches ampliﬁes the response of ﬁrm’s surplus
to productivity shocks. This increases the volatility of job creation and thus
of unemployment. The success of the model in generating the empirical
volatilities of vacancies and unemployment depends on whether the required
rigidity of the relevant measure of wages is consistent with the data. The
studies reviewed suggest that wages in the data may not be as rigid as required
for generating empirical volatilities of vacancies and unemployment in the
standard search and matching model.
Theremainderofthepaperisstructuredasfollows. Section1summarizes
thetextbooksearchandmatchingmodelandtheunemploymentvolatilitypuz-
zle. Using an example, I demonstrate the importance of the expected present
discountvalueofwagesforthejobcreationdecision. Section2surveysempir-
icalevidenceonthecyclicalityofindividualwagesofthenewlyhiredworkers
and wages of workers in ongoing relationships. Then I review empirical ev-
idence on the cyclicality of a measure of wages that takes into account the
expected present discounted value of future wages. Section 3 concludes.
1. SEARCHAND MATCHING MODEL
The Standard Model
Aneconomyispopulatedbyacontinuumofﬁrmsandacontinuumofmeasure
1 workers. Both ﬁrms and workers are risk neutral and inﬁnitely lived. Firms
maximize the present discounted value of proﬁts. Workers maximize the
presentdiscountedvalueofwagesanddonotvalueleisure. Firmsandworkers
discount the future with a common discount factor β, 0 <β<1. Time is
discrete.
Aﬁrmcanchoosetoremaininactiveortostartproduction, whichrequires
only labor input. To start production, a ﬁrm must enter the labor market and
hire a worker. Upon entering the labor market, a ﬁrm opens a vacancy and
searches for a worker. During each period a ﬁrm must pay a per vacancy cost,
c. Anunemployedworkerreceivesaperperiodunemploymentcompensation,
b, andcostlesslysearchesforajob. Employedworkersearnwagesandcannot
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they form a match that immediately becomes productive. While matched,
all ﬁrm-worker pairs have the same constant return to scale production tech-
nology, which uses a unit of labor indivisibly supplied by the worker. Each
ﬁrm-worker match produces per period output z, thus z is also aggregate pro-
ductivity. zevolvesstochasticallyaccordingtotheﬁrst-orderMarkovprocess.
Every period, a ﬁrm-worker pair separates exogenously with probability δ.
Giventhenumberofunemployedworkers,u,andthenumberofvacancies,
v, the number of newly created matches in the economy is determined by a
matching function, m(u,v). It is assumed that m(u,v) = Kuαv1−α, where
0 <α<1 (Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001) and K is a positive constant. Let
θ denote labor market tightness, i.e., θ ≡ v
u. Let q(u,v) ≡
m(u,v)
v = Kθ−α
denote the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy for a ﬁrm. Let μ(u,v) ≡
m(u,v)
u =
Kθ1−α denote the probability of ﬁnding a job for an unemployed worker.
Thus, the unemployment in this economy evolves according to the following
equation, given u0:
ut+1 = ut + (1 − ut)δ − μ(ut,v t)ut.
Dropping the time subscripts and using   to denote the next period values,
I summarize the value functions of a worker and of a ﬁrm as follows. The
value function of a ﬁrm with a worker is




where z´denotes productivity in the next period and Ez is a conditional ex-
pectations operator. Equation (1) takes into account that in each period with
probability δ,the ﬁrm-worker match separates and the ﬁrm obtains a value of
an inactive ﬁrm, which is 0. The value function of an opened vacancy is




The value function of an employed worker is







The value function of an unemployed worker is
U(z)= b + βEz
 
μ(θ(z ))W(z ) + (1 − μ(θ(z )))U(z )
 
. (4)
There are two important conditions in the standard model. First, there is
free entry for ﬁrms, i.e., ﬁrms enter the labor market and post vacancies until
the value of an open vacancy, V(z), equals the value of an inactive ﬁrm, 0.
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c
q (θ (z))
= J (z). (5)
Second, wages are rebargained every period in new and ongoing matches
according to the Nash bargaining rule. The Nash bargaining rule yields the
following division of the surplus from the match, S(z) ≡ J(z)+ W(z)−
V(z)− U(z), in every period:
J(z)= (1 − η)S(z), (6)
W(z)− U(z)= ηS(z), (7)
where η is a worker’s bargaining power, 0 <η<1. Equations (6)–(7) imply
that each party obtains a constant share of the surplus from the match.
Using equations (1)–(5) yields the following equation for the surplus:
S(z) = z − b + βEz((1 − δ)− Kθ(z )1−αη)S(z ). (8)
Combining (5) and (6) yields the job creation condition
c
Kθ(z)
−α = (1 − η)S (z). (9)
Combining (8) with the job creation condition yields the following equa-
tion for the evolution of the vacancy-unemployment ratio:
c
Kθ(z)−α = (z − b)(1 − η)+ βEz((1 − δ)− Kθ(z )1−αη)
c
Kθ(z )−α. (10)
Equation (8) links the evolution of the vacancy-unemployment ratio, θ,
to the productivity shock, z. Using this equation and common parameter
values, Shimer (2005) shows that the standard search and matching model
cannot generate the volatilities of vacancies and unemployment observed in
the data. In particular, in the U.S. data, the standard deviation of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio is 20 times larger than the standard deviation of labor
productivity. The standard search and matching model predicts the volatility
of the vacancy-unemployment ratio as almost one-to-one to the volatility of
the productivity. Since productivity shocks are the driving force in the model,
the model is said to lack an internal propagation mechanism.3 This failure
of the standard search and matching model to generate empirical volatilities
of vacancies and unemployment is often referred to as the unemployment
volatility puzzle (Pissarides 2009).
3 See Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005) for a detailed inspection of the mechanism.
See also Costain and Reiter (2008).184 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Rigid Wages Within Matches
To understand what measure of wages affects allocations in the search and
matching model, consider the following modiﬁcation of the standard model.
In the standard search and matching model, wages in both newly formed and
ongoing matches are set in each period using the Nash bargaining rule. In
the modiﬁed model, wages in newly formed matches are set using the Nash
bargaining rule but wages in ongoing matches remain constant and equal to
thewageatthetimeofhiring. Wewillseethatthemodiﬁedmodeldeliversthe
sameequationforthevacancy-unemploymentratio,thusthesameallocations,
given the initial conditions, as the standard model despite the fact that in the
modiﬁed model wages in ongoing matches are rigid. The modiﬁed model is
a discrete time version of the argument presented in Shimer (2004).4
Inthestandardmodel,giventhatallmatchesareequallyproductive,wages
of new hires and existing workers are equal in each period. This implies that
when the aggregate productivity is zt, the value of a ﬁrm with a worker in an
ongoing match that started in period t0,Jt0(zt), equals the value of a ﬁrm in
the newly formed match, J t(zt). Similarly, when the aggregate productivity
is zt, the value of an employed worker in an ongoing match that started in
period t0,Wt0(zt), equals the value of a newly hired worker in t,Wt(zt).I n
the modiﬁed model, these values are not necessarily equal. Dropping the time
subscripts, using z0 to denote the aggregate productivity at the time a match
is formed and using   to denote the next period values, we can summarize the
value functions in the modiﬁed model as follows:
J z0 (z) = z − w(z0) + β (1 − δ)EzJ z0  
z  
;
V (z) =− c + Kθ(z)
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Inthemodiﬁedmodelthefreeentrycondition,(5),andthesurplusdivision
rule, (6)–(7), are required to hold only for the values at the time of hiring,
which can be denoted as J z(z) for a ﬁrm and Wz(z) for a worker. Thus, in the
modiﬁed model, equations corresponding to equations (6), (7), and (9) are as
follows:
J z(z) = (1 − η)Sz(z), (11)
4 See also Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2009) and Pissarides (2009) for insightful dis-
cussions of this example and Rudanko (2009) for a model with endogeneous wage rigidity within
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Wz(z) − U(z)= ηSz(z), (12)
c
q(θ(z))
= (1 − η)Sz(z), (13)
where Sz (z) is the surplus from a newly formed match when the aggregate
productivity is z,Sz(z) ≡ J z(z) + Wz(z) − V(z)− U(z).
To demonstrate that this modiﬁed model delivers exactly the same allo-
cations as the standard model (in which wages are rebargained in all matches
every period), it sufﬁces to show that it delivers the same equation for the
vacancy-unemployment ratio as the standard model, (10). Using equations
for J z0 (z),Wz0 (z), and U(z), one can derive the following equation for the
total surplus of the newly formed match:
Sz(z) = z − b + β(1 − δ)EzSz(z ) + βηEzμ(θ(z ))Sz 
(z ), (14)
where z´is productivity in the next period.











w(z) is a present discounted value of wages paid to a worker
hired when the aggregate productivity is z. Similarly, Wz(z ) = Wz 




(w(z ) − w(z)). Then Sz(z ) = J z(z ) + Wz(z ) − U(z ) =
J z 
(z ) + Wz 
(z ) − U(z ) = Sz 
(z ). Substituting Sz(z ) for Sz 
(z ) in (14)
yields
Sz(z) = z − b + βEz((1 − δ)− μ(θ(z ))η)Sz 
(z ), (15)
where Sz(z) is the surplus from a newly created match when the aggregate
productivity is z and Sz   
z  
is the surplus from a newly created match when
the aggregate productivity is z .
Substituting Sz(z) from the job creation condition (13) into (15) yields
exactly the same equation for the vacancy-unemployment ratio, θ,a si nt h e
standard model, equation (10):
c
q(θ(z))





els deliver the same total surplus at the time of hiring, and it is split between a
workerandaﬁrmbythesamerule. However, theydifferinhowthewagesare
determined within ongoing employment relationships. In the standard model,
wages are renegotiated for every match in every period. Because all matches
are equally productive, this implies that newly hired workers and workers in
existing employment relationships receive the same wages. In the modiﬁed
model, wages of newly hired workers are determined based on the aggregate186 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
productivity at the time of hiring. Once set, the wage remains rigid through-
out the duration of the match. The modiﬁed model generates wages of newly
hiredworkersthataremoreresponsivetotheaggregateconditionsthanwages
of the workers in ongoing relationships. However, in the modiﬁed model, the
rigidity of wages within employment relationships does not affect allocations.
Thus, this example shows that the rigidity of wages in ongoing matches is not
sufﬁcient to amplify the volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
To understand what kind of wage rigidity has an effect on allocations in
the model, rewrite the job creation (13) using (1−η)Sz(z) = J z(z) and using












where wt,τ is a period τ wage of a worker hired in period t. Equation (16)
shows the relationship between the labor market tightness, θ(zt), and the
expectedpresentdiscountedvalueofwages, Et
 ∞
τ=t (β (1 − δ))
τ−t wt,τ (zt),
given productivity zt. Note that Et
 ∞
τ=t (β (1 − δ))
τ−t zτ is a function of zt
alone. Both θ(zt) and Et
 ∞
τ=t (β (1 − δ))
τ−t wt,τ (zt) change in response to
changesinzt. Theextentoftheresponseofθ(zt)tozt dependsontheextentof
the response of the expected present discounted value of wages to be paid in a
new employment relationship that starts at t. However, it does not depend on
the change of wages within the employment relationship if this change does
not affect the expected present discounted value of wages to be paid in a new
match.
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CYCLICAL
BEHAVIOR OF WAGES
Thissectionreviewstheempiricalevidenceonwagecyclicality. First,Ipresent
the empirical evidence on the behavior of individual wages over the business
cycle, distinguishing wages of new hires from wages of workers in ongoing
employment relationships (often referred to as job stayers). Second, I present
the empirical evidence on the history dependence of wages. Then, I present
the evidence on the cyclical behavior of a measure of wages that takes into
accountboththeinitialwageandtheexpectedvalueoffuturewagespaidinthe
newly formed matches. Finally, I summarize the quantitative implications of
the evidence for the volatility of vacancies and unemployment in the standard
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Cyclicality of Wages of New Hires and Wages of
Existing Workers
Below I provide a statistical model of individual wages with a particular em-
phasisonhowwagesdependontheunemploymentrate. ThenIsurveyresults
from the empirical studies that include information on individual workers and
from the studies that include information on workers and their employers.5
The ﬁndings show that wages of newly hired workers are more procyclical
than wages of job stayers. All of these studies refer to current wages and not
to the expected present discounted value of future wages.
General Framework
In labor economics the standard statistical model for wages is Mincer regres-
sion, which attributes variation in the logarithm of wages to the observable
characteristics of a worker—years of schooling, a quadratic polynomial in
labormarketexperience, andotherfactors(Mincer1974). Thesevariablesare
supposed to reﬂect productivity (or human capital) differences. The literature
that studies the behavior of individual wages over the business cycle includes
the contemporaneous unemployment rate as a business cycle indicator. What
is of interest for the questions in this article are the differences, if any, of the
responses of wages of workers in ongoing matches (job stayers) and wages of
new hires to changes in the unemployment rate.
The individual wage equation that distinguishes between the cyclical re-
sponse of wages of job stayers and wages of new hires is speciﬁed as follows:
lnwit = Xiα + Xitγ + βUt + βnhUt ∗ Inh
it + δInh
it + ηi + vit, (17)
wherewit isarealwageofworkeri int,Xi isavectorofobservableindividual-
speciﬁc explanatory variables that remain ﬁxed over time, Xit is a vector of
individual controls that vary with time, Ut is a measure of the unemployment
rate, and ηi and vit are the unobservable error terms. Inh
it is a dummy variable
that takes value 1 if an individual is a new hire, and 0 otherwise. The new hire
isdeﬁnedasaworkerwhohasbeenemployedataﬁrmforlessthanaspeciﬁed
period, usually one year. Error terms are assumed independent of each other
andofallexplanatoryvariablesinX. ThevariablescommonlyincludedinXit
are a quadratic in worker labor market experience and a quadratic in tenure
(for job stayers). Because of the structure of the survey data, the time period
is typically one year.
5 Given a large literature, this survey does not aim to summarize all works on the real wage
cyclicality. An interested reader is referred to the surveys in Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) and
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Thecoefﬁcientontheunemploymentrateisinterpretedasasemi-elasticity,
whichindicatesapercentchangeinwageinresponsetoaonepercentagepoint
increase in the unemployment rate. If the semi-elasticity is positive, the wage
is called procyclical, i.e., it moves positively with the business cycle. For job
stayers the cyclicality is measured by β. If the cyclicality of wages of new
hires differs from the cyclicality of job stayers, then the coefﬁcient on the
interaction term, βnh, is statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero and the
cyclicality of new hires is measured by β + βnh.
Evidence fromWorker Survey Data
Most of the existing evidence on the cyclicality of individual wages comes
from studies that use individual level survey data: the National Longitudinal
Survey (NLS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY). These data allow tracking individual
workers’histories across time and contain information on individual workers’
characteristics, including education, age, sex, and job characteristics such as
industry and occupation.6
Bils (1985) is the ﬁrst study that examines the cyclicality of individual
wages while separating the wages of job stayers from the wages of new hires.
He also distinguishes between new hires who are hired from another job and
new hires who are hired from unemployment. Using the individual data on
menfromNLSfortheperiod1966–1980, Bilsﬁndsthatastheunemployment
rate increases by one percentage point, individual wages of white male work-
ers on average decrease by 1.59 percent. Once the job changers are explicitly
accounted for, the results show that wages of job changers are much more
procyclical than wages of job stayers. In particular, wages of job stayers de-
crease by 0.64 percent while wages of job changers decrease by 3.69 percent
in response to one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. Sim-
ilarly, wages of workers who move in and out of employment are also more
procyclical than wages of workers who do not change jobs.
Shin (1994), using a different estimation procedure for the NLS data on
men’s wages from 1966–1981, estimates separate equations for workers who
remain with the same employer from t − 1t ot and for workers who change
their employer. Similarly to Bils, Shin ﬁnds substantially procyclical wages
for workers who change employers and much less procyclical wages for job
stayers. Solon,Barsky,andParker(1994)estimatewagecyclicalityusingdata
from the PSID for the period 1967–1987. They ﬁnd that the point estimate
of the cyclicality of men’s real wages is between −1.35 percent and −1.40
percent. In the sample restricted to workers who did not change employers,
6 The type of data set, which contains information on the cross section of individuals over
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the coefﬁcient reduces to −1.24 percent. Consistent with Bils (1985), Solon,
Barsky, and Parker ﬁnd that wages of job stayers are less procyclical than
wages of all workers.
The usual measure of wages used in the studies is the average hourly
wage, which is constructed by dividing total annual earnings by total annual
hours worked. However, if workers are more likely to hold more than one
job in expansions, then the constructed average hourly wage may be more
procyclical than actual wages within employment relationships. Devereux
(2001) conducts a detailed examination of the cyclicality of wages of job
stayers and, in contrast to the earlier studies, focuses on the wages of workers
who have only one job at a time. Using PSID data from 1970–1992 on men’s
earnings, Devereux ﬁnds that the cyclicality of the average wage of these
workers is −0.54 percent. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that wages of job stayers
are less procyclical than wages of job changers.7
Evidence from Matched Firm-Worker Data
Controlling for a ﬁrm ﬁxed effect is important if there are changes in the com-
position of ﬁrms over the business cycle with respect to the level of wages
theyoffer. Forexample, iftheﬁrmsthathireineconomicboomsarepredomi-
nantlyhigh-wageﬁrmsandtheﬁrmsthathireineconomicbustsarelow-wage
ﬁrms, then the failure to control for the ﬁrm’s ﬁxed effect may lead to biasing
the estimates of the cyclicality away from zero even when wages are acycli-
cal. Researchers often use occupation and industry ﬁxed effects to control for
changes in the composition of jobs over the business cycle, which is readily
available from worker survey data. Most of the studies employ individual
worker survey data that do not allow identiﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s ﬁxed effect.
Toallowidentiﬁcationofaﬁrmﬁxedeffect, thedatamustcontaininformation
on more than one worker from the same ﬁrm and on ﬁrm identiﬁers. Only
recently have longitudinal ﬁrm-worker data for the U.S. economy become
available; however, to my knowledge, there are no studies of wage cyclicality
using these data yet.
Carneiro, Guimar˜ aes, andPortugal(2009)useadministrativeﬁrm-worker
datafromPortugal. Theyestimateamodelinlevelssimilarto(17),controlling
for an individual worker’s qualiﬁcation, education, age, and a quadratic in
time trend. Their ﬁndings are very similar to the ﬁndings by Bils (1985). In
particular, controlling for a worker and a ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, they ﬁnd that the
cyclicality of wages of workers who have been with their employer for less
than a year is −2.77 percent. The cyclicality of wages of workers who have
been with an employer for more than a year, job stayers, is −1.41 percent.
Importantly, accounting for both ﬁrm and worker ﬁxed effects delivers results
7 Shin and Solon (2007) ﬁnd similar evidence in the NLSY data.190 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
very similar to the results from accounting only for worker ﬁxed effect. In
particular, the cyclicality of wages of new hires from the regression with only
a worker ﬁxed effect is −2.73 percent, while with only a ﬁrm ﬁxed effect it is
−3.53 percent. The cyclicality of wages of job stayers from the regressions
with only a worker ﬁxed effect is −1.50 percent, while from the regression
with only a ﬁrm ﬁxed effect it is −2.94 percent. Using the same data set,
Martins, Solon, and Thomas (2010) investigate the cyclicality of wages of
newly hired workers in a subset of occupations into which ﬁrms frequently
hire new workers. The estimated cyclicality of the wages of newly hired
workers in these entry jobs is −1.8 percent. The authors conclude that the
wages of new hires in the entry jobs are substantially procyclical.8
The results from the studies that allow controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects
conﬁrmtheearlierﬁndingsthatwagesofnewlyhiredworkersaremorecyclical
than wages of existing workers.
Cyclicality ofWages of Job Stayers and Job Changers and
Match Quality
Gertler and Trigari (2009) suggest that the difference in the cyclicality of
wages of new hires and existing workers can be explained by the differences
in the quality (or, alternatively, productivity) of newly formed and ongoing
matches. In particular, Gertler and Trigari argue that separately controlling
forﬁrmandworkerﬁxedeffectscannotaccountformatchquality,whichmust
be controlled for by the interaction term—a worker-job ﬁxed effect. Gertler
and Trigari use individual male worker data from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation over the period 1990–1996. The data consists of four
panels from 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993, each lasting approximately three
years and containing information from interviews conducted every four
months. The data allow for identifying if a worker changes employer. Gertler
and Trigari estimate a wage equation similar to equation (17) except that, in-
steadofcontrollingforaworkerﬁxedeffect,ηi,theycontrolfortheunobserved
ﬁrm-workereffect, whichsimultaneouslycapturestwoeffects: aworkerﬁxed
effect that does not change from job to job and a joint worker-ﬁrm effect. Af-
ter the authors control for a worker-ﬁrm ﬁxed effect, the coefﬁcient on the
interaction term between the unemployment rate and the dummy for new hire
becomes small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Gertler and Trigari interpret the
results as evidence of an omitted variable, a worker-ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed effect.
If a job change is systematically associated with the movement from low to
high quality match, then the omitted variable is negatively correlated with the
interaction term, biasing the estimates. They conclude that a large part of the
8 Martins, Solon, and Thomas (2010) conclude that the cyclicality is of the similar magnitude
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higher procyclicality of wages of new hires is probably due to the compar-
atively higher quality of these matches. Gertler and Trigari suggest that the
existing literature does not provide conclusive evidence that the newly hired
workers have more cyclical wages than the existing workers in the same ﬁrm.
This ﬁnding raises questions, which I discuss at the end of this section,
aboutwhatheterogeneityinthedatashouldbecontrolledforwhencalculating
the statistics and how to bring the model to match these statistics.
Dependence of Wages on the Past Labor
Market Conditions
Literature surveyed so far ﬁnds evidence that the wages of new hires are more
sensitive to the aggregate labor market conditions than the wages of workers
in ongoing employment relationships. A closer look at workers in ongoing
employment relationships shows that their wages depend not only on current
labor market conditions, but also on the history of labor market conditions
during the entire employment relationship.
Beaudry and DiNardo Regressions






= Xjt0tα+γ startUt0 +γ cUt +γ min min{Uτ}t
τ=t0 +ηj +νjt, (18)
where wjt0t is an hourly wage of a worker j in year t who was hired in year
t0, Xjt0t is a vector of the individual- and job-speciﬁc characteristics, Uτ is
the unemployment rate in year τ, ηj is an individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect,
and νjt is an individual- and time-varying error term. νjt is assumed to be
serially uncorrelated as well as uncorrelated across individuals. The vector
of individual- and job-speciﬁc characteristics, Xjt0t, includes a quadratic in
experience, a quadratic in tenure, years of schooling, and dummies for indus-
try, region, race, union status, marriage, and standard metropolitan statistical
area. The equation is estimated using the individual data on men’s wages
from PSID, 1976–1984, and two cross-sectional samples from the Current
Population Survey (CPS).
The main ﬁnding of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) is that when all three
measures of the unemployment rate are included, the effect of the minimum
unemploymentrateisthemostsigniﬁcant,bothstatisticallyandeconomically.
Thus, whenever the labor market conditions improve, wages increase. In par-
ticular, controlling for worker ﬁxed effect in the PSID sample, the coefﬁcient
on the minimum unemployment rate is −2.9 percent, the coefﬁcient on the
unemploymentrateatthestartofthejobis−0.6percentandinsigniﬁcant,and
the coefﬁcient on the contemporaneous unemployment rate is −0.7 percent.192 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
If, however, only the contemporaneous unemployment rate is included, then
the results are consistent with earlier studies—the coefﬁcient on the contem-
poraneous unemployment rate is −1.4 percent.
Subsequent studies replicate the ﬁndings of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)
for different time periods and using different data sets. McDonald and
Worswick (1999) ﬁnd support in Canadian data. Grant (2003) estimates an
equation similar to (18) and adds the maximum unemployment rate experi-
encedbyaworkerfromthestartofthejob. Grantﬁndsthatboththeminimum
unemployment rate and the contemporaneous unemployment rate have an ef-
fect on wages. In particular, in the sample of young men from NLS from
1966–1983, when all three unemployment rates are included, the coefﬁcient
on the minimum unemployment rate is −2.29 percent while the coefﬁcient
on the contemporaneous unemployment rate is −2.37 percent. This ﬁnding
leads Grant to conclude that wages depend both on the past and on the con-
temporaneous labor market conditions.
DevereuxandHart(2007)studythehistorydependenceinwagesinBritish
data,theNewEarningsSurveyPanel,fortheperiod1976–2001. Theyestimate
a model similar to (18) that also includes the maximum unemployment rate
butemployadifferentestimationprocedurefromthestudiesabove. Theyﬁnd
that both the minimum unemployment rate and the contemporaneous unem-
ployment rate are statistically signiﬁcant and negative. The authors conclude
thattheBritishrealwagedataexhibitboththehistorydependenceasdescribed
in Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) and the dependence on the contemporaneous
labor market conditions.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2009) ﬁnd that the dependence on the past un-
employment rates in model (18) disappears if one controls for the quality of a
match. They argue that the quality of a match can be learned from the number
of job offers a worker receives throughout the total duration of the job, which
can be approximated by the sum of the aggregate vacancy-unemployment ra-
tios experienced by a worker throughout the job. In addition, if a worker
switches job-to-job, then the sum of labor market tightnesses experienced
during a previous job also helps predict the quality of the current match. Us-
ing the NLSY, the authors ﬁnd that if these controls are included in Beaudry
and DiNardo’s (1991) equation, (18), the coefﬁcients on the past unemploy-
ment rates are insigniﬁcant both economically and statistically, while the new
controls have a large positive effect.
Evidence from Matched Firm-Worker Data
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) provide compelling evidence on the
history dependence of wages in the study of the wage policy of a large ﬁrm
over the period 1969–1988. The authors ﬁnd that there is a substantial cohort
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sample in a given year.9 That is, much of the variation in wages between
cohortscomesfromthedifferencesinstartingwages,whichimpliesthatwages
depend on the history of the labor market conditions from the start of the job.
The authors investigate whether the differences in the starting wage can be
driven by observable or unobservable worker characteristics. To check for the
possibleimpactofunobservablecharacteristics,theyexaminewhethercohorts
that entered with lower starting wages are promoted less and exit more. They
ﬁnd no evidence of this and no evidence that composition effect can fully
account for either the differences in starting wages or the persistent effect of
external labor market conditions from the start of the job on wages.
Using a large matched employer-employee data set from Northern Italy,
Macis (2006) provides a detailed empirical investigation of the dependence of
wagesontheunemploymentratesfromthestartofthejob,controllingforboth
ﬁrm and worker ﬁxed effects. Using a model similar to (18), Macis ﬁnds that
wages are correlated with both the best and the worst labor market conditions
from the start of the job, as well as with the contemporaneous unemployment
rate.




of workers in ongoing employment relationships, and wages depend on the
history of labor market conditions from the start of the job. As discussed
earlier, what is relevant for job creation is the expected present discounted
valueofwagespaidinanewlyformedmatch. Nevertheless,fromtheevidence
presented so far we can form some intuition about the cyclical behavior of the
measureofwagesthattakesintoaccountboththeinitialwageandtheexpected
value of future wages.
Consider a ﬁrm that decides whether to hire a worker in the current period
or to hire in the following period. In addition, suppose that in the current
period unemployment is high but is expected to return back to its lower level
in the following period. Since wages of newly hired workers are procyclical,
thehiringwageintheemploymentrelationshipthatstartsinthecurrentperiod
is low. Because of the history dependence of wages, the future wages in this
relationshiparealsoexpectedtobelowerthanthewagesinthematchesformed
in the future periods. Thus, by hiring now a ﬁrm locks in a worker to a stream
9 In the study, the authors cannot identify whether the entrants are the new hires at the ﬁrm
or are internally promoted. They argue that it is plausible that both categories of workers are
treated in the same way by the ﬁrm. Their comparison of wage patterns of these workers with
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of wages that is lower as compared to a stream of wages to be paid to a worker
hired the following period. Consequently, the wage costs associated with
hiringinthecurrentperiodarecomparativelylowerbecausetheinitialwageis
low and because of the future wage savings. Similarly, if in the current period
the unemployment rate is low and is expected to increase in the following
period, the total wage costs associated with hiring in the current period are
comparatively higher than the total wage costs associated with hiring in the
following period. This argument, developed in Kudlyak (2009), suggests that
the relevant measure of wages that a ﬁrm takes into account at the time of
hiring is low when unemployment is high and high when unemployment is
low,whichistheoppositeofbeingrigid. Togaugethequantitativeimportance,
we need empirical estimates of this cyclical volatility.
Using the free entry condition for ﬁrms, Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens
(2009) argue for the importance of the elasticity of the expected present dis-
counted value of wages with respect to the expected present discounted value
of productivity in newly formed matches, which they refer to as permanent
values of wages and productivity, respectively. They do not estimate the
elasticity directly but aim at providing the empirical bounds for this statistic.
Usingsimulationsofthestandardmodel, Haefke, Sonntag, andvanRenscon-
clude that “the elasticity of the current period wage of newly hired workers
with respect to current period productivity ...constitutes a good proxy for the
elasticity of the permanent wage with respect to permanent productivity for
the case of instantaneously rebargained wages.” Using the simulations of a
model, similar to the modiﬁed model presented in Section 1 above, they argue
that “the elasticity of the current period wage of newly hired workers with
respect to current period productivity ...can be seen as a lower bound for [the
elasticity of the permanent wage with respect to permanent productivity] in
the case of wage rigidity on the job.” Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2009)
proceedtoestimatetheelasticityofwagesofnewlyhiredworkerswithrespect
to productivity using a large data set on wages of newly hired workers from
nonemployment from the CPS. The estimated model for wages is similar to
the models presented above except that, instead of using the series of unem-
ployment,theyusetheseriesoflaborproductivityasacyclicalindicator. They
ﬁnd that the elasticity of wages of newly hired workers from nonemployment,
0.8, is substantially larger than the elasticity of wages of all workers, 0.2.10
Kudlyak (2009) provides an estimate of the cyclical behavior of the mea-
sure of wages that takes into account the initial wage and the expected present
value of future wages to be paid in a newly formed match. The ﬁrm’s hiring
decision can be thought of as a decision to hire in the current period versus
10 Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2009) document that the elasticity of wages of job-to-job
movers is similar to the elasticity of wages of newly hired workers from nonemployment or even
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waiting one more period and hiring then. In equilibrium, the marginal pro-
ductivity of an additional worker equals the user cost of labor, which is the
difference between the expected present discounted values of the costs asso-
ciated with creating a match with a worker in the current period and the costs
associated with creating a match the following period. In a model with search
and matching, these costs consist of expenses on hiring a worker, i.e., costs
associated with vacancy posting, and wage payments to a worker.
Using individual wage data from the NLSY, Kudlyak (2009) estimates
the cyclicality of the wage component of the user cost of labor, which equals
the wage at the time of hiring plus the expected present discounted value of
the differences from the next period onwards between the wages paid to the
workerhiredinthecurrentperiodandtheworkerhiredthefollowingperiod.11
The estimated cyclicality of the wage component of the user cost of labor is
−4.5 percent as compared to the cyclicality of wages of newly hired workers
of −3 percent. The greater cyclicality obtains because at the time of hiring,
a ﬁrm to some degree locks in a worker to a stream of wages that depends
on the economic conditions from the start of the job. Thus, the rigidity of
wages within employment relationships actually ampliﬁes the ﬂuctuations of
the expected present discounted value of wages to be paid to a newly hired





data must be contrasted with the statistics obtained from the model. This task
is conducted in Pissarides (2009), Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2009), and
Kudlyak (2009).
Pissarides(2009)comparestheelasticityofwageswithrespecttoproduc-
tivity obtained from the standard search and matching model using common
parametervaluestotheelasticityofwagesofnewlyhiredworkerswithrespect
to productivity in the data. He ﬁnds that the elasticity of wages of new hires
with respect to productivity in the data is close to 1. This is consistent with
the elasticity of wages generated by the standard search and matching model
with Nash bargaining. He concludes that any solution to the unemployment
volatility puzzle should be able to generate this near-proportionality of wages
ofnewhiresandproductivity. Thus,amodelwithmorerigidwageswillnotbe
able to match the data. The same conclusion is reached by Haefke, Sonntag,
and van Rens (2009), who compare their estimates of the elasticity of wages
11 See Kudlyak (2007) for more details on the estimation.196 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of newly hired workers with respect to productivity to the statistics from the
standard search and matching model.
Kudlyak(2009)calibratestheelasticityofthewagecomponentoftheuser
cost of labor in the model to the empirical estimate and examines how much
volatility of vacancies and unemployment the calibrated model can generate.
She concludes that the data lack required rigidity to amplify the ﬂuctuations
of vacancies and unemployment in the model.
Statistics Conditional on Match Quality
Gertler and Trigari (2009) ﬁnd that, conditional on match quality, there is no
differencebetweenthecyclicalityofwagesofnewhiresandexistingworkers.
Theyarguethattheirﬁndingimpliesthatassumingthesamecyclicalityfornew
hires’and existing workers’wages within each ﬁrm in the standard search and
matching model is consistent with the existing micropanel data evidence on
new hires’wages once the empirical evidence controls for match quality, i.e.,
matchproductivity. Theirﬁndingthat,conditionalonmatchquality,thereisno
difference between the cyclicality of wages of new hires and existing workers
is consistent with the evidence that the wages that ﬁrms pay to newly hired
workers are (unconditionally) more procyclical than the wages of workers in
ongoing matches. Note, however, that if the conditional statistics are used for
calibrating the model, i.e., if the wage statistics from the model are compared
to the conditional wage statistics in the data, then the driving force of the
model—productivity—as well as other statistics in the model should also be
conditioned accordingly.
Gertler and Trigari’s evidence suggests a possible source of the differ-
ence between the cyclicality of wages of new hires and wages of the existing
workers—the difference between the quality of a newly formed match and of
an existing match. It implies that there is economically signiﬁcant cyclical
heterogeneity in match quality between newly formed and ongoing matches.
In contrast, in the standard search and matching model, newly formed and
ongoing matches are homogeneous, i.e., they are equally productive in every
period. Thus, for the model to generate cyclical volatilities, the ﬁnding calls
for a modiﬁcation of the model to incorporate the cyclical heterogeneity.
3. CONCLUSION
What matters for the hiring decision of a ﬁrm over the business cycle is the
cyclicality of the expected value of wages paid in newly formed matches.
Most of the existing studies are concerned with the cyclicality of the current
wage. The evidence on the cyclicality of the expected present value of future
wages to be paid in a newly formed match is scarce.
The data provide evidence of the difference between the cyclicality of
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In particular, the studies document that a one percentage point increase of the
unemployment rate is associated with approximately a 3 percent decrease in
wages of newly hired workers. Wages of workers in ongoing matches are
less responsive to the contemporaneous labor market conditions and depend
on the history of the labor market conditions from the start of the job, i.e.,
they are more rigid as compared with the wages of newly hired workers. This
wagerigiditywithinemploymentrelationshipsmay,infact,maketheexpected
present value of wages to be paid in newly formed matches more cyclically
volatile than the wage of new hires.
Haefke, Sonntag, andvanRens(2009), usingsimulationsfromthemodel,
argue that the wage measure that takes into account future wages in a match
is likely more volatile than wages of new hires. Kudlyak (2009) provides an
estimate of the cyclicality of the user cost of labor, which takes into account
hiring wage and the expected future wages to be paid in the employment rela-
tionship. She ﬁnds that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate is associated with a 4.5 percent decrease in the expected difference be-
tween the present value of wages to be paid in a match created in the current
period and in a match created in the following period.
The evidence suggests that the measure of wages relevant for job creation
is rather procyclical. In fact, using the existing empirical evidence and also
providing new estimates, recent studies ﬁnd that, quantitatively, the data may
not exhibit the required rigidity necessary to generate the empirical volatility
of unemployment in the standard search and matching model.
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